Fiscal fragility: what the past may say about the future by Joshua Aizenman & Gurnain Kaur Pasricha
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FISCAL FRAGILITY:









We would like to thank Kristina Hess for excellent research assistance.  The views expressed in the
paper are those of the authors.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Bank of Canada or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Joshua Aizenman and Gurnain Kaur Pasricha. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Fiscal fragility: what the past may say about the future
Joshua Aizenman and Gurnain Kaur Pasricha




The end of the great moderation has profound implications on the assessment of fiscal sustainability.
The pertinent issue goes beyond the obvious increase in the stock of public debt/GDP induced by
the global recession, to include the neglected perspective that the vulnerabilities associated with a
given public debt/GDP increase with the future volatility of key economic variables. We evaluate for
a given future projected public debt/GDP, the possible distribution of the fiscal burden or the flow
cost of funding debt for each OECD country, assuming that this in future decades resembles that in
the past four decades.  Fiscal projections may be alarmist if one jumps from the priors of great moderation
to the prior of permanent high future burden.  Prudent adjustment for countries exposed to heightened
vulnerability may entail both short term stabilization and forward looking fiscal reforms.
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The global crisis has brought to the fore the fiscal vulnerabilities of OECD countries. 
There is a growing recognition of the fiscal vulnerabilities of some countries of the Euro block 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and others). The ability of the US to obtain relatively 
cheap funding of its debt delays, but does not negate the fiscal challenges facing the US.   
While the crisis added to the debt burdens, the fiscal vulnerabilities are not new. Rather, 
they were built up gradually before the crisis, as a result of demographic transition (aging 
population and declining fertility) affecting most OECD countries and the commitments made by 
the welfare states.  The “great moderation” (i.e., the drop in volatility and risk premium during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s), and the growing belief that this great moderation was here to 
stay, mitigated fiscal concerns. During that period, the sharp decline in the price of risk and in 
the risk free interest rate allowed a growing sense of complacency in Europe and the US 
regarding the exposure to fiscal challenges. The current global crisis made clear that the spell of 
great moderation was a transitory hiatus. The purpose of this note is to illustrate that the end of 
the great moderation has profound implications for the assessment of fiscal sustainability.  The 
pertinent issue goes beyond the obvious increase in the stock of public debt/GDP induced by the 
global recession, to include the neglected perspective that the vulnerabilities associated with a 
given public debt to GDP ratio increase with the future volatility of key economic variables.  
A common measure of fiscal burden is the funding flow needed to keep public debt/GDP 
constant.  Specifically, a public debt/GDP ratio, d, would grow overtime at a rate equal to the 
gap between the real interest rate on the debt, r, minus the growth rate of the economy, g, 
assuming a primary balance of zero, i.e.,  ( ) (/ ) dr gP B D d =− −  , where d   is change in d over 
continuous time, PB is the government’s primary balance and D is the public debt.
2  Henceforth 
we refer to the gap (r – g) as the flow cost of public debt.  The fiscal burden associated with a 
given public debt/GDP ratio, d, equals (r-g)*d. Vulnerability projections of the IMF and other 
international financial organizations frequently focus on postulating the expected future pattern 
of d.  Such projections portray the path of public debt/GDP in future years by adjusting the 
present debt/GDP according to the expected future path of taxes and fiscal commitments. We 
supplement this approach with fragility analysis based on what the past data says about (r-g).  
                                                            
2 Obstfeld and Rogoff  (1996).   2
Specifically, we evaluate for a given future projected public debt/GDP the possible distribution 
of the fiscal burden if the distribution of flow cost of funding debt in future decades resembles 
the past four decades.   While there is no obvious threshold indicating a funding crisis, higher 
burden of public debt [(r – g)*d] increases the need for fiscal adjustment in the form of some 
combination of lower government expenditure and transfers, and higher taxes. 
Looking at the past to provide insight about the future has been a neglected perspective 
since before the crisis.  The low real interest rate and the moderate growth of OECD countries 
during the era of the “great moderation” implied very low fiscal burden.  Perceiving the great 
moderation as an enduring state instead of a lucky draw induced fiscal laxity.  Arguably, 
derailing short term economic stabilization based on projections of permanent gloomy growth 
rates today may be an equally invalid perspective.  Taking the past four decades as guidance for 
possible future developments helps in avoiding the fallacy of framing the future in terms of a 
unique scenario, a strategy that may lead to either too optimistic or too pessimistic priors, 
possibly magnifying the resultant macro volatility.  Looking at the past data is useful, as it 
indicates that growth rates and real interest rates are highly unstable over time, with low 
correlations across decades (Easterly et al., 1993; Mishkin, 1981).  Fiscal projections may be 
alarmist if one jumps from the priors of great moderation to the prior of permanent high future 
burden.  Yet, the importance of both r and g in determining the actual debt burdens as well as the 
range of scenarios faced by OECD countries in the past suggests that countries exposed to 
heightened vulnerability may consider both short term stabilization and forward looking fiscal 
reforms.   
 
Average flow costs of public debt since 1970 
To construct the flow costs of public debt, we first collect data on the current average 
effective maturity of general government debt for OECD countries (Table 1).
3 The average 
OECD country had an effective maturity of general government debt of around 6 years. UK debt 
had the highest maturity, about 14 years and Hungary the lowest, of 3 years. We then use the 
series of average annual real interest rate on the government debt of maturity most closely 
corresponding to the actual effective maturity of general government debt, and the growth rate of 
                                                            
3 The effective maturities in Table 1 correspond to the year 2010 or the latest available values. The data 
are sourced from Bloomberg, BIS, EU and national sources.    3
real GDP, to compute the annual flow cost, (r-g) for each country.
4 The annual series of (r-g) is 
then averaged over 5-year intervals starting in 1970. The annual real interest rate and growth rate 
series are plotted in figure 1, and the average flow costs for the 5-year periods are shown in 
Table 2. Most OECD countries had negative flow costs of public debt during the 1970’s, due to 
the negative real interest rates owing to high inflation in this period. Most countries saw their 
flow costs peak in one of the three periods between 1980 and 1994. The average flow costs 
during the last decade were low or moderately negative. The table illustrates the large swings in 
flow costs for each country, indicating that the debt burden associated with any given d can vary 
considerably, depending on the difference between real interest rate and GDP growth. 
In addition, the distribution of (r-g) may be characterized by fat tails. To test this, in 
Table 3, we present the statistics on relative kurtosis of the annual series of (r-g) for each country 
and the results of normality tests. The distribution of (r-g) is leptokurtic in Germany, Greece, 
Korea, Japan and the USA.
5 The normality hypothesis is rejected by the Shapiro-Wilk test for 12 
out of the 26 countries and by the joint skewness and kurtosis test in 11 countries. In addition, in 
Table 4, we present the realized probabilities of bad outcomes, i.e. realizations of (r-g) exceeding 
the intra-country mean by 1.645 or more standard deviations. The last three columns of Table 4 
list the ex-post probability of (r-g) ≥ μ + 1.645σ, (r-g) ≥ μ + 1.96σ and r-g ≥ μ + 2.3267σ, 
respectively. For a normally distributed variable, these probabilities would equal 0.05, 0.025 and 
0.01, respectively. For nine countries, the realized probability of an extremely adverse outcome 
(corresponding to r-g ≥ μ + 2.3267σ) exceeds 0.02, i.e. is over double what it would be in a 
normal distribution. For 17 out of the 26 countries, the realized probability of an (r-g) exceeding 
the mean by 1.96 standard deviations or more is higher than the corresponding probability in a 
normal distribution, 0.025. The possibility of fat tails indicates a need to evaluate carefully, both 
the average and extreme scenarios in projecting debt burdens.  
In order to evaluate the various outlooks for the future debt burdens for OECD countries, 
we use the World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections of gross general government debt/GDP 
                                                            
4 The nominal interest rates on debt were converted into real interest rates by subtracting the rate of 
growth of GDP deflator.  
5 A leptokurtic distribution is more “peaked” than the normal distribution and has a fatter tail. Its kurtosis 
is greater than 3.    4
ratio, d, for each country, for the year 2015 (Table 1).
6  A majority of the OECD countries are 
expected to have debt/GDP ratios exceeding 60% by 2015. For the projected debt/GDP ratios, 
we compute the implied debt burdens for each country, for each of the scenarios in Table 2. 
Figure 2 plots the best case, the worst case and the average of the best and the worst scenarios for 
each country. We define the best case scenario as the one with the lowest flow cost, based on the 
historical average flow costs in Table 2. The worst case scenario is analogously defined. All but 
three OECD countries in Figure 2 will have a negative debt burden in the best case scenario. A 
negative debt burden implies that the government can run a primary deficit and yet keep the 
debt/GDP ratio constant (or more precisely, that it would have to run a primary deficit in order to 
keep the debt/GDP ratio constant, which would otherwise shrink).  Only Italy, Denmark and 
Sweden have positive debt burdens under the historical best case, and should this scenario 
prevail, their gross debt burden for the projected 2015 debt/GDP ratio would be 0.03, 0.52 and 
0.11 percent of GDP, respectively.  Italy’s debt burden in the best case scenario is lower than that 
of Sweden and Denmark, even though its projected debt is 124.7 percent of GDP, while Sweden 
and Denmark have low projected debts of 37.6 and 49.8 percent of their GDP, respectively. In 
fact, should the (r-g) turn out to be negative, the higher the debt/GDP ratio, the lower the debt 
burden. In the best case scenario, the US debt burden is lower than that of UK and Canada, 
although the projected US debt is higher than both countries.  
Most OECD countries have worst-case projected debt burdens over 2 percent of GDP, 
which, if realized, would likely be onerous, given their population dynamics and the 
commitments of the welfare state. The US has an above-average debt burden in the worst case 
scenario, of about 3.9 percent of GDP.  Greece by far has the highest debt burden in the worst 
case scenario, of about 12.4 percent of GDP.  In the worst case scenario, a Greek default is not a 
far-fetched possibility. Another interesting case is of Portugal, which has recently seen a cut in 
its sovereign rating by all three international ratings agencies, but whose debt burden is moderate 




6 The figures are as reported in the May 2010 IMF Fiscal Monitor.  
7 Portugal’s projected debt does not take into account the budget cuts announced on May 10, 2010.    5
The prudence of fiscal adjustment increases with the uncertainty of the future debt burden. In 
Figure 3, we use three different measures to capture the uncertainty implied by the variation in 
(r-g). In Figure 3.a., we plot the difference between the historical worst and best case scenarios. 
The country with the greatest uncertainty in the future debt burden is Japan, followed by Greece, 
Belgium, Ireland, France and Canada. The US has the 11
th highest uncertainty in terms of (worst-
best) scenarios. While most countries that have low projected debt ratios occupy the lower end of 
the scale, that is, they have lower uncertainty in future debt burdens, this uncertainty does not 
increase monotonically with the size of projected debt. The US projected debt for 2015 is higher 
than the projected debt of 7 of the countries that face greater uncertainty in debt burden than the 
US.  
In figure 3.a, Japan’s figure is inflated by the very negative flow costs it saw in its period 
of high growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In figure 3.b and 3.c, we narrow our focus to less 
extreme events.  In order to figure 3.b, we use an alternative measure of uncertainty after 
excluding the possibility of an extremely lucky draw for all countries. We re-define best and 
worst scenarios after excluding the periods (from Table 2) with the highest average g or the 
lowest average r. The uncertainty is lower for most countries
8, than in figure 3.a. It is lower still 
in figure 3.c, where we use the standard deviation of the annual series of (r-g), times d.  
Nevertheless, the size of the uncertainty faced by most countries, those with high projected debt 
and those with relatively lower projected debt, indicates a need for caution in formulating short 
term policy based on overtly pessimistic scenarios, and also for forward looking fiscal reforms.  
Several caveats apply to the above analysis. In so far as the debt projections do not 
include unfunded liabilities, the actual debt burden may be higher in all scenarios. The debt 
burden, or the primary balance needed to keep the debt/GDP ratio constant, is computed here 
using gross government debt (due to easier data availability), but an accurate measure of the debt 
burden would use net government debt. While these considerations would change the actual 
numbers of projected debt burdens, they wouldn’t undermine the overall message, which is that 




8 Except for 6 countries, for which it is the same.    6
Conclusions 
Our analysis highlights the uncertainty in future debt burdens facing OECD countries and 
the importance of future real interest rates and growth rates in determining the debt burden, 
particularly for countries with high projected debt/GDP ratios. In so far as the future growth may 
depend on short term stabilization during or in the aftermath of a financial crash and a deep 
recession, the additional debt incurred for such stabilization may not translate into excessively 
high future flow costs of public debt.   However, we also emphasize that the uncertainty of future 
debt burden is likely to increase with the size of the future debt/GDP ratios. Prudent fiscal policy 
therefore may involve both short term stabilization and forward looking fiscal reforms. 
Admittedly, doing both simultaneously has challenged the political capacities of the US and 
Europe.  Yet, going overboard with only one of the two adjustments (i.e., focusing only on short 
term stabilization, or on forward looking fiscal reforms in the form of early belt tightening) may 
increase vulnerabilities.  Focusing only on stabilization in the form of fiscal stimulus and 
monetary easing raises concerns about the cost of government borrowing (as in the case of 
Greece and the weaker underbelly of the Euro area).  Focusing only on belt tightening today may 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on General Government Gross Debt by Country 
  Average Effective Debt 
Maturity (years) 
Projected 2015 debt as 
percent of GDP 
Australia  4.97 20.9 
Austria  7 77.3 
Belgium  6 99.9 
Canada  6 71.2 
Czech Republic  6.40 49.9 
Denmark  8 49.8 
Finland  5 76.1 
France  6.96 94.8 
Germany  6 81.5 
Greece  7.9 140.4 
Hungary  3 64.0 
Ireland  7 94.0 
Italy  7.07 124.7 
Japan  6.25 250.0 
Korea, South  5 26.2 
Netherlands, the  6.02 77.4 
New Zealand  4 36.1 
Norway  5 53.6 
Poland  5 62.1 
Portugal  6.0  98.4 
Slovak Republic  5 41.9 
Spain  7 94.4 
Sweden  7 37.6 
Switzerland  6 36.2 
UK  13.98 90.6 
US  4.58 109.7 
Source: Average effective maturity from Bloomberg and national sources. Projected debt/GDP percentage from April 
2010 WEO and IMF staff calculations, as reported in May 2010 IMF Fiscal Monitor. 
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Table 2: Average difference between real interest rate and real growth rate   
a.  Eurozone OECD Economies 
   Austria*  Belgium Finland  France Germany  Greece Ireland Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Slovak 
Republic 
Spain 
1970-74  -4.5  -5.1   -6.9  -0.9  -5.1   -4.8       
1975-79  -0.1  -0.3    -10.5  0.5    -7.0    -0.9     
1980-84  2.8  5.5   -5.8  3.7  0.2   4.8     2.6 
1985-89  1.3  2.9 -0.9 1.8 1.7    2.5 3.1  3.0  -4.2    0.7 
1990-94  2.0 3.8  10.0  4.3  -0.5  8.8  2.3  6.1 3.1 1.5    4.2 
1995-99  2.3  2.2 -0.4 3.9 3.1 1.8 -7.4 2.2  -0.2 -0.3    0.4 
2000-04  1.3  0.8  0.3 1.1 2.7 -2.9 -5.6 0.0  -0.2  0.1 -3.4 -2.8 
2005-09  0.1  0.9  1.4 -0.2 1.9 -0.6 2.2 1.9  0.8  1.5 -2.7 -0.6 
2010 
Q1 
0.3  -2.3  1.9  2.8  0.2 10.9  10.7 2.3  4.3  1.1 -0.9 5.8 
*Real rates for Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and with a 9-10 year maturity for 1983-2010 
b. Non-Eurozone OECD Economies 
   Australia  Canada  Czech RepublicDenmark Hungary Japan Korea New  Zealand Norway Poland Sweden Switzerland UK  USA 
1970-74  -8.1 -5.5        -9.0           -5.7 -2.4 -2.8 
1975-79  -4.4 -3.6        -2.6           2.0 -5.6 -3.2 
1980-84  1.5 3.1    4.3    1.7           -1.4  2.1  3.5 
1985-89  2.1 2.1    4.4   -0.8  -3.1  3.5  5.9   2.0  -1.3  0.5  1.8 
1990-94  5.1 5.5    4.9    1.8  -2.3  5.0  4.0   5.3  1.8 3.6  1.8 
1995-99  1.2 1.4  3.3  1.9  -0.3  2.0  1.8  3.0  -1.3  0.4  1.7  1.8 0.8  0.3 
2000-04  -1.3 -0.5  -1.6  1.0 -3.0 1.3  -2.1 -0.5  -1.8  2.4  0.4  0.9  -0.4 -0.6 
2005-09  -1.5 0.3  -1.6  1.3 3.4 2.4  0.1  1.5  -2.9  -2.1  0.3  -1.0 1.3  -0.1 
2010 Q1  1.1 -2.4  1.4  0.0 5.8  -0.2  -5.5  -0.8  -0.2  -0.5  2.2  0.5 1.8  -0.3 
Note: The real interest rate is the average annual real interest rate on general government debt of maturity most closely corresponding to the latest available average maturity of 
general government debt. These average maturities are listed in Table 1. The growth rate of GDP deflator was used to convert nominal interest rate to real rate.  
Source: Authors' calculations using data from OECD, BIS, EU and national sources   10
Table 3: Relative Kurtosis and tests for normality in the annual (r-g) series. 
      Relative  Shapiro-Wilk W-test 
Joint Skewness and 
Kurtosis Test 
Country Observations  Kurtosis W  P-value  Chi-2  P-Value 
Australia 38  0.59  0.97  0.29  2.61  0.27 
Austria 39  -0.12  0.93  0.02  4.71  0.09 
Belgium 39  0.35  0.96  0.25  4.18  0.12 
Canada 39  0.19  0.98  0.54  1.21  0.55 
Switzerland 39  0.65  0.96  0.76  3.79  0.15 
Czech Republic  13  -1.07  0.98 0.52  1.07  0.59 
Germany 39  3.95 0.91  0.00  15.80  0.00 
Denmark 27  -0.84  0.98  0.75  1.05  0.59 
Spain 30  -1.01  0.93  0.06 2.80 0.25 
Finland 22  0.27  0.87  0.01  5.81  0.05 
France 39  -0.67  0.97  0.37  1.82  0.40 
UK 39  2.71 0.93  0.02  11.01  0.00 
Greece 18  -0.86  0.90  0.05 2.71 0.26 
Hungary 13  0.83  0.90  0.12  5.74  0.06 
Ireland 39  0.14  0.96  0.19  3.05  0.22 
Italy 22  -0.35  0.90  0.03 3.35 0.19 
Japan 39  2.93 0.87  0.00  14.95  0.00 
Korea 23  5.96 0.80  0.00  18.83  0.00 
Netherlands 39  -0.52  0.98  0.70  0.32  0.85 
Norway 25  -0.53  0.97  0.54  1.44  0.49 
New Zealand  25  0.99  0.92  0.05  7.16  0.03 
Poland 11  -0.21  0.97  0.89  1.32  0.52 
Portugal 24  1.09  0.96  0.35  3.96  0.14 
Slovak Republic  10  2.56  0.76  0.00  11.35  0.00 
Sweden 23  1.03  0.94  0.17  6.35  0.04 
USA 39  1.77 0.95  0.06  7.20  0.03 
Note: The number in bold denote significance at 10 percent level. For the relative kurtosis, the cut-off for 









Table 4: Realized probabilities of bad outcomes 
No. Of Observations  Realized Probability at cut-off where    
Total  for which (r-g) is greater than  probability in a Normal Distribution equals  Country 
   μ + 1.645σ  μ + 1.96σ  μ + 2.3267σ 0.05  0.025  0.01   
39 1  1  0  0.026  0.026   Belgium 
39 1  1  0  0.026  0.026   Switzerland 
39 1  1  0  0.026  0.026   UK 
39 1  1  1  0.026  0.026 0.026  USA 
39 1  0  0  0.026     Germany 
39 1  0  0  0.026     France 
39 1  0  0  0.026     Japan 
38 1  1  1  0.026  0.026 0.026  Australia 
27 1  0  0  0.037     Denmark 
25 1  1  1  0.040  0.040 0.040 
New 
Zealand 
23 1  1  1  0.043  0.043 0.043  Korea 
23 1  1  1  0.043  0.043 0.043  Sweden 
39 2  1  1  0.051 0.026 0.026  Ireland 
39 2  1  0  0.051 0.026    Netherlands 
39 2  0  0  0.051     Canada 
18 1  1  0  0.056 0.056    Greece 
30 2  1  0  0.067 0.033    Spain 
13 1  1  1  0.077 0.077 0.077  Hungary 
24 2  0  0  0.083     Portugal 
22 2  2  1  0.091 0.091 0.045  Finland 
22 2  2  0  0.091 0.091    Italy 
11 1  1  0  0.091 0.091    Poland 
10 1  1  1  0.100 0.100 0.100 
Slovak 
Republic 
39 0  0  0        Austria 
13  0  0  0     
Czech 
Republic 
25  0  0  0      Norway 
 
Note:  μ refers to the mean of (r-g) and σ to its standard deviation. Both are computed from annual observations on 
(r-g) and are country-specific. The last three columns give the ex-post probability of (r-g) ≥ μ + 1.645σ, (r-g) ≥ μ + 
1.96σ and r-g ≥ μ + 2.3267σ, respectively. The probability of (r-g) ≥ μ + 1.645σ for a normally distributed variable 
















































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE CZE
DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR
GRC HUN IRL ITA JPN KOR
NLD NOR NZL POL PRT SVK
SWE USA














Note: *Real rates for Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and with a 9-10 year maturity for 
1983-2010. Real rates for all other countries are the real rates on the maturity closes to the most recent average maturity of general government debt in Table 2. 
The growth rate of GDP deflator was used to convert nominal interest rate to real rate.   13
Figure 2: General Government Gross Debt Burden of Selected OECD Economies, 
Historical Best Case, Worst Case and Average Scenarios 
(using projected 2015 debt/GDP) 
 
Note: The gross debt burden representing the lowest flow costs is calculated by taking an average of the two lowest 
values of the difference (r-g), respectively, and multiplying it with the projected debt to GDP ratio. For countries for 
which flow costs for less than 4 periods are available, the single highest and lowest costs are used. *Real rates for 
Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and with a 9-
10 year maturity for 1983-2010. Real rates for all other countries are the real rates on the maturity closes to the most 
recent average maturity of general government debt in Table 2. The growth rate of GDP deflator was used to convert 
nominal interest rate to real rate. 




Figure 3: Uncertainty in General Government Gross Debt Burden of Selected OECD Economies,  
(using projected 2015 debt/GDP) 
 
3.a.  Historical (Worst – Best) Scenarios 
 
 
Note: The gross debt burden (or the flow cost of projected debt) representing the lowest (best scenario) and the 
highest (worst scenario) flow costs is calculated by taking an average of the two lowest and the two highest 
historical values, respectively, of the  r-g from Table 1, and multiplying it with the projected debt to GDP ratio. For 
countries for which data for less than 4 periods is available, the single lowest and highest flow costs are used. Real 
rates for Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and 
with a 9-10 year maturity for 1983-2010. Real rates for all other countries are the real rates on the maturity closes to 
the most recent average maturity of general government debt in Table 2. The growth rate of GDP deflator was used 








Note: The gross debt burden (or the flow cost of projected debt) representing the lowest (best scenario) and the 
highest (worst scenario) flow costs is calculated by taking an average of the two lowest and the two highest 
historical values, respectively, of the  r-g from Table 1, and multiplying it with the projected debt to GDP ratio. For 
countries for which data for less than 4 periods is available, the single lowest and highest flow costs are used. Real 
rates for Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and 
with a 9-10 year maturity for 1983-2010. Real rates for all other countries are the real rates on the maturity closes to 
the most recent average maturity of general government debt in Table 2. The growth rate of GDP deflator was used 




3.c. Uncertainty: Standard Deviation of annual (r-g) X Debt/GDP 
 
Note: The gross debt burden (or the flow cost of projected debt) representing the lowest (best scenario) and the 
highest (worst scenario) flow costs is calculated by taking an average of the two lowest and the two highest 
historical values, respectively, of the  r-g from Table 1, and multiplying it with the projected debt to GDP ratio. For 
countries for which data for less than 4 periods is available, the single lowest and highest flow costs are used. Real 
rates for Austria are based on the average return on bonds with maturities greater than one year for 1970-1982, and 
with a 9-10 year maturity for 1983-2010. Real rates for all other countries are the real rates on the maturity closes to 
the most recent average maturity of general government debt in Table 2. The growth rate of GDP deflator was used 
to convert nominal interest rate to real rate. 
 